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Abstract 
The paper examines the determinants of scientific productivity (number of articles 
and journals’ impact factor) for a panel of about 3600 French and Italian academic 
physicists active in 2004-05. Endogeneity problems concerning promotion and 
productivity are addressed by specifying a generalized Tobit model, in which a 
selection probit equation accounts for the individual scientist’s probability of 
promotion to her present rank, and a productivity regression estimates the effects 
of age, gender, cohort of entry, and collaboration characteristics, conditional on 
the scientist’s rank. We find that the size and international nature of collaborative 
projects and co-authors’’ past productivity have very significant impacts on 
current productivity, while age and gender, and past productivity are also 
influential determinants of both productivity and probability of promotion. 
Furthermore we show that the stop-and-go policies of recruitment and promotion, 
typical of the Italian and French centralized academic systems of governance, can 
leave significant long-lasting cohort effects on research productivity. 
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1. Introduction and overview 
Countries exhibit very substantial differences in their scientific productivity 
as well as in the institutional settings of their research activities (May, 1997; King, 
2004). However, most of the available studies on academic scientists’ productivity 
and careers are based upon US data, and their theoretical insights and policy 
implications take for granted the institutional characteristics of US universities 
(Long, 1978; Allison and Long, 1990; Levin and Stephan, 1991; Lee and Bozeman, 
2005). Little is known in fact on the determinants of academic scientists’ 
productivity in Europe. European university systems differ substantially both 
from their US counterparts and among themselves, the most important differences 
being related to the degree of autonomy of universities, the size and flexibility of 
the academic job market, and the relative weight and quality of universities and 
public research organizations (PROs) within the national science system. 
In this paper we study various determinants of careers and scientific 
productivity of academic physicists in France and Italy, by taking explicitly into 
consideration the institutional context of the two countries. In both France and 
Italy, universities have very limited autonomy and compete for human and 
financial resources with large PROs (especially important in France). Their 
tenured staff are civil servants recruited and promoted through centralized 
procedures controlled by the State. This centralization tends to originate highly 
irregular recruitment and promotion “waves”, such that career opportunities may 
be absent for long intervals of time, and then appear all of a sudden as a 
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consequence of a policy decision. We expect such irregularities to result in long-
lasting cohort effects on productivity, which we wish to compare with other 
productivity determinants found to be significant by US-based studies.  
We thus investigate the effects of age, gender, cohort of entry and past 
productivity both on individual scientists’ current productivity and on their  
career progress. We also consider the role of size and nature (nternational vs. 
national) of  research projects as well as the influence of co-authors’ productivity. 
We base our analysis upon a panel of about 3600 academic physicists, with the 
exception of nuclear and astro-physicists, all of them active in academic year 2004-
05. Our productivity measures, both in terms of “quantity” and of “quality”,  
derive from information from the ISI-Web of Science pertaining to a set of some 
360 journals covering most specialized journals in physics with some reputation 
(namely, with at least a five-year average impact factor of 0.5).  
We consider five productivity regressions, one for each main position in the 
academic ranking of the two countries, from assistant to full professor: precisely 
Maitre de Conference (MCF) and Professor (PR) in France, and Ricercatore 
Universitario (RU), Professore Associato (PA) and Professore Ordinario (PO) in 
Italy. We also specify three selection probit equations accounting for the 
individual scientist’s probability of promotion from respectively MCF to PR, RU to 
PA, and PA to PO. The three productivity regressions for PR, PA and PO are 
estimated jointly with the three corresponding promotion equations as a 
generalized Tobit model by means of Heckman two-step method. Estimating a 
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productivity regression for each rank, and jointly with a promotion probit 
equation for professors helps in controlling for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity across ranks and in correcting for selectivity in promotion to 
professorship. We also take care of individual heterogeneity among individual 
physicists by including past productivity variables in all equations: three year 
average lagged productivity in the promotion probit equations, and average 
productivity before recruitment (for MCF and RU) or promotion (for PR, PA and 
PO) in the productivity regressions. 
As expected from the background literature, our results confirm the 
existence of age and gender effects both on the probability to be promoted and on 
productivity conditional on academic rank, although with some differences 
between ranks and countries. They also confirm that physicists’ own past 
productivity has very significant positive impacts on promotion probability and 
current productivity. We find that the size and international nature of 
collaborative projects, as well as co-authors’ past productivity, are influential 
determinants of current productivity. Finally, we provide significant evidence that 
the physicists recruited or promoted in 1980 in Italy and in 1985 in France (when 
massive recruitment and promotion waves took place after several years with 
limited career opportunities) are on average less productive than the other 
physicists, showing the damaging and long-lasting effects of the stops-and-goes in 
recruitment and promotion policies typical of the two centralized academic 
systems. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we very 
briefly outline the background literature, and in section 3 we present at some 
length the institutional features and relevant historical developments of the French 
and Italian academic systems in the past 30 years. In section 4 we explain our data 
and justify our choice of econometric specification, and in section 5 we comment 
in detail our results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Background literature 
Interest in the determinants of individual scientists’ productivity goes back 
to the XIX century1. From the very start, enquiries on scientific productivity were 
meant to cast light on a two separate issues: the soundness of eugenic principles 
proposed by Sir Francis Galton, whose studies on the “hereditary genius” had 
been largely based on the demographics of “eminent men of science”; and the 
impact of academic institutional arrangements and incentive schemes on a 
country’s scientific performance, as measured by the number of outstanding 
scientists from that country (Cattell, 1903; Godin, 2006; Godin 2007)2. Both the 
issues have been debated ever since and are still present in today’s studies, 
although quite often in a disguised manner.  
Since the 1960s, sociologists of science have tested whether increasing 
returns to scientific reputation and productivity (presently referred to as 
“Matthew effect”) may explain Lotka’s law better than the unequal distribution of 
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intelligence in the population (Merton, 1968; Merton, 1988; David 1994). A typical 
result in this direction has been obtained by Long and Fox (1995), who find that, 
other things being equal, graduates from prestigious universities have a higher 
chance to get their first job at institutions in the same league, with substantial 
advantages in terms of present and future research productivity. As for individual 
determinants, gender is the one that has attracted most of the attention, with 
cognitive and genetic explanations of gender differences (as opposed to social 
ones) being still debated (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Fox, 1999; Spelke, 2005).  
Understanding the relationship between academic institutions, incentive 
schemes, and scientists’ performance has become increasingly important over the 
last 30 years or so. This surge of interest can be explained by the policy makers’ 
wish to measure and increase the effectiveness of the public funding of science. 
Leading research universities and scientists, facing possible budget cuts, have also 
actively lobbied in favour of a higher concentration of resources on the basis of 
publication- and citation-based indicators of excellence (Graham and Diamond, 
1997).  
An important line of research explores the impact of age and tenure on 
scientists’ productivity. In particular, many studies have explored the possibility 
that individual scientific productivity follows a life cycle: productivity increases 
when the scientist is young, reaches a peak at/before middle age, and declines 
afterwards (Levin and Stephan, 1991). At the same time, studies on tenure have 
tried to clarify whether observable life cycles are due to biological factors or to the 
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incentive structure, such as the reduced “publish-or-perish” pressure on senior 
scientists with tenured positions. In a rare study on a non-US sample, Turner and 
Mairesse (2002) find that while promotion has a positive effect on the quantity and 
quality of publications, the time spent on the same tenured senior position has a 
negative impact on both variables. They also show that being a member of a 
highly productive laboratory fuels individual productivity. This confirms that 
some institutional variables, such as the stratification of universities according to 
prestige and funding, may generate increasing returns in science.  
3. Recruitment and careers of academic scientists in France and Italy 
Most of the available literature on scientific productivity is based both 
theoretically and empirically on the US case. This is an important limitation, 
because the latter is not representative of university systems worldwide3. The 
centrality of universities for public science, the degree of academic job mobility, 
and the clear stratification of universities according to research intensity are 
typical characteristics of the USA (Ben-David, 1992; Clark, 1993). In countries such 
as France and Germany, for example, large public research organizations such as 
CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) or the Max Plank Institute have 
been regarded by policy makers as the main pillars of the public research system; 
Italy also followed this model for many years with CNR (Consiglio Nazionale delle 
Ricerche). 
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As for job mobility, we observe that US universities select candidates for 
professorial jobs in total autonomy, with no control from the central (federal) or 
state governments. Professors of all ranks are university employees who can 
bargain for their wages and working conditions on an individual basis; in addition, 
the existence of a proper academic job market allows scientists with a strong 
publication record to move across universities in search of better paid or better 
funded research positions (Ehrenberg et al., 1990). This is hardly the case in France 
and Italy. In these centralized systems university staffs are considered civil 
servants, who are employed by the government and selected by commissions of 
senior peers, chosen by national members of the relevant discipline or nominated 
by government. In these countries, there is not a strong competition between 
universities for recruiting or promoting the most promising or productive 
scientists. 
At the same time, strict dependence of universities on government funding 
(which tend to be highly pro-cyclical) and the frequent reforms of the recruitment 
procedures tend to make career perspectives highly erratic. Italy, for example, has 
a long history of prolonged periods during which universities did not recruit new 
scientists, due to funding shortages or ongoing policy revisions, followed by 
sudden waves of mass recruitment and promotions, often under the political 
pressure exerted by the large number of scientists seeking a tenured position after 
many years of temporary contracts. 
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3.1 Academic careers in France and Italy 
The French academic system has two main positions: “Maitre de conférence” 
(MCF; roughly equivalent to the US rank of assistant professor) and “Professeur” 
(PR). In Italy there are three positions: “Ricercatore universitario” (RU), “Professore 
Associato” (PA) and “Professore ordinario” (PO). In French physics, MCFs amount to 
around two thirds of tenured faculty, while in Italy each of the three ranks adds 
up to around one third of tenured faculty (see figure 1). 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
All positions are tenured, and for all of them the teaching and research 
duties, as well as the wages, are defined by national laws, with limited possibility 
of negotiation at the local level. Whatever their rank, academics are classified by 
the government according to their discipline. Such disciplines act very much as 
professional guilds, since their members (and not individual universities or 
department) control the recruitment process4. Before accessing any of the above-
mentioned positions (most often RU in Italy and MCF in France) young scientists 
go through post-doc positions of various lengths. Universities that wish to recruit 
a young scientist or promote any member of the academic staff are subject to a 
series of administrative constraints, which limit their freedom to allocate funds to 
recruitment or career progress in the absence of governmental approval, and 
require them to follow a set of complex procedures to place a job call and collect 
the related applications. In addition, the job calls may be suspended by the 
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government at any time for either financial or regulatory reasons, forcing 
universities to delay their recruitment or promotion plans.  
In Italy and France, these constraints have often clashed against an 
increasing demand for higher education instruction, whose growth was 
particularly intense in the 1960s and 70s. In those years, both countries answered 
to the growing number of students of those years by hiring a large number of 
young assistants with fixed-terms contracts or when tenured weak prospects of 
promotion (Professori incaricati as well as contrattisti and assegnisti in Italy, and 
Assistants and Maitres Assistants in France). In early 1980s, two reform acts were 
passed: law 382 in Italy (in 1980) and the Higher Education Act in France (in 1984). 
Both laws reformed the recruitment process by introducing the ranking system we 
described above, and by changing the hiring rules. At the same time, a number of 
ad hoc measures were passed along with the new laws, which were meant to allow 
many professori incaricati and assistants to obtain tenured positions as ricercatori or 
professori associati in Italy, or maitres de conference in France. In Italy, the ad hoc 
procedures were merely formal and candidates did not face any selective 
competition5 (Clark, 1977; Moscati, 2001). As a result, in each country there was a 
massive recruitment wave (respectively in 1980 and 1985), followed by a 
prolonged period without any recruitment in Italy, and by a sensible decline in 
recruitment in France. Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this effect for the field of physics: 
they report the number of scientists - who were on active duty in 2004-05 - by year 
of recruitment (for RU and MCF) or year of last promotion (for those in 
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professorial positions). The 1980 and 1985 entry/promotion peaks are clearly 
visible. 
[FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
The 1980 and 1984 laws also had lasting effects on the selection procedures. 
In Italy, it was established that the promotion to PA and PO had to occur at a 
national level, for a number of positions issued every other year by the ministry, 
and managed by a professors’ committee whose members were first chosen by all 
peers in each discipline, and then further selected by the ministry. As for RUs, 
these were selected at the university level by a committee of three among PAs and 
POs, all appointed by the ministry. Together with the universities’ lack of financial 
autonomy, this highly centralized system soon became responsible for a number 
of difficulties in speeding up the recruitment process by universities throughout 
the 1980s and early 1990s (see again Figure 3). 
In 1998 a new recruitment system was introduced, which was still in place 
at the time of our study6. The system allows each university to offer new positions 
by launching its own call for applications (concorso), and to set up an examination 
committee. All the committee members, however, must belong to the same 
discipline for which the position is offered and (with the exception of just one 
member) they are not selected by the university, but elected by all the discipline 
affiliates at the national level. Nominally, the commission has not the task to pick 
the most suitable candidate for the university that launched the call (on the basis, 
for example, of the coincidence of the candidate’s and the university’s research 
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interests), but the best possible candidate in absolute terms, who should be the one 
with the best publication record (called “idoneo”, which means fit-for-the-job). In 
principle, if the university does not like this candidate, it can always refuse to 
nominate him/her and launch a new job call. In practice, most commissions try to 
steer the selection process towards candidates deemed suitable for the university.7 
Once again the introduction of the new law coincided with a new wave of 
recruitment; although less dramatic than the 1980 one, this is still visible in Figure 
2, in the years between 1999 and 2001.  
The French recruitment system is also very centralized and discipline-
centred 8 . Every year, the central government issues a list of vacancies, by 
discipline and institution, both for the MCF and PR positions. The applicants need 
first to get a qualification certificate, which is granted by the CNU (Conseil National 
des Universités) – whose members are partly elected and partly designated by the 
Ministry of Education. Once obtained, the qualification is valid for four years and 
the qualified candidates are the only ones who can apply for the vacant positions. 
Applications will then be examined at the university level, by disciplinary 
commissions, composed both of local and non-local members9.  
Both the Italian and the French recruitment systems have undergone severe 
criticism over the years, which resulted in a succession of reforms that shifted the 
balance of decision power in recruitment matters back and forth between the 
national and local level (Chevaillier, 2001; Moscati, 2001; Musselin, 2005). None of 
these reforms, however, has gone as far as to grant universities total freedom in 
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recruitment matters, nor it has diminished much the power of disciplines. More 
importantly, the procedural uncertainty created by this succession of reforms, 
combined with repeated cuts in the public spending for universities, has made the 
recruitment process very irregular over time.  
Time irregularities in recruitment and career advancement mechanisms 
determine the age composition of the academic workforce. Table 1 reports the 
number of physicists in France and Italy in 2004-05 by rank and decade of birth. 
As expected, the lower academic ranks are populated by younger scientists in both 
countries. However, in Italy the top academic rank (PO) is populated by much 
older scientists than its French equivalent (PR): while in France 19.6% of the full 
professors (PR) were born in the 1960s, in Italy the percentage of PO from the 
same decade is only 2.6%. Although less striking, such differences in age 
composition hold also for the lower ranks: only 11.6% of Italian RU were born in 
the 1970s, as opposed to 25.0% of French MCF. This is a very likely consequence of 
the higher emphasis on seniority-career links in Italy, and of the higher 
irregularity of the Italian recruitment process. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, an important institutional feature of both the French and the Italian 
research systems is the role of large PROs such as CNRS and CNR, respectively. In 
France, CNRS has been traditionally regarded as the most important actor of the 
research system (even more so in physics, with the exception of nuclear physics, 
where that role is contended by CEA, a special agency for atomic energy). As such, 
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it has often out-competed universities in attracting the best and most motivated 
young scientists, who may perceive the academic position of MCF as overloaded 
with teaching and administrative duties (not so much the professor’s position, 
which is often targeted by CNRS Chargés de recherche). In Italy, the history of CNR 
starts similarly to that of CNRS, which indeed was taken as a model for its 
creation, in the late 1930s. Badly hit by successive budget cuts, the CNR has 
progressively lost its centrality in the Italian research system, as well as the 
possibility to offer permanent positions to young scientists. This implies that while 
French universities have at least one competitor in the academic labour market, 
Italian universities have none.10 
3.2 Implications for scientific productivity 
The analysis of the recruitment process in the two countries, and of the 
relative balance of universities and PROs inside the research system, suggests 
some observations on the factors affecting scientific productivity. In principle, 
productivity is a key determinant of career advancement in both countries, at least 
for senior positions. In a related paper we show that this is indeed the case in 
France for moves up to PR positions, and in Italy for promotion from RU to PA 
but less so for promotion from PA to PO (see Pezzoni et al., 2009). As a 
consequence, other things being equal, we should expect scientists who are 
currently on higher positions to be more productive than those in lower ones. We 
should also expect such scientists to exhibit a less pronounced life cycle that is to 
be highly productive over a longer time spell, and to incur a productivity 
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slowdown at a later age. However, especially for Italy, informal recruitment and 
promotion practices push in the direction of career by seniority and can give great 
advantages to local candidates, no matter their productivity. If these effects were 
dominant, they would significantly weaken the effectiveness of incentives to high 
productivity. 
We also expect to find strong effect for the different years of 
entry/promotion both in Italy and France, for at least three reasons. First, access to 
tenured academic positions has increasingly become more difficult over the 1980s 
and 1990s, so we may presume that scientists who have been recruited over these 
two decades are more productive than their predecessors. Second, late generations 
of scientists have more international experience and may be expected to find it 
easier to publish in international journals, which in our data are better represented 
than national ones. Last, cohorts of scientists recruited en masse over short periods 
of time (after periods of no recruitment) could be either more productive or less 
productive than the average. We expect the RU, PA and MCF that entered the 
university system in 1980 in Italy and 1985 in France (or reached their last 
academic rank), to be less productive, due to the explicit lack of selective pressure 
in those two years. We do not have any a priori on the effect of the 1980 and 1985 
entry waves on the productivity of scientists in higher positions (PO and PR), 
which were much less affected by these legislative changes. 
We expect productivity to grow over time (calendar years) for at least three 
reasons. First, both in Italy and in France public research funding has been 
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increasingly distributed on the basis of competitive grants. Second, physics, as any 
other discipline, has enjoyed decreasing publishing cost, thanks to new 
procedures and media. Finally, and especially in physics, “big science” and large 
projects have favoured teamwork, which tends to increase productivity, as 
measured by publishing (Price and Beaver, 1966)11. 
As for gender, no apparent reason exists to think of peculiarities for France 
and Italy with respect to the US, so we expect to find evidence of a statistically 
significant gender effect in both countries. Stratification effects may also exist, 
which we try to capture with information on the affiliation and productivity of our 
scientists’ co-authors. 
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1 Data collection and sample 
Our data collection is based on lists of all tenured academics in Italian and 
French universities, active in academic year 2004/2005, provided by the Ministries 
of Education of the two countries. The lists classify academics according to their 
disciplinary affiliation: as indicated in Table 2, the individuals we have selected 
are those active in all fields of physics, with the exception of astro-physics and 
nuclear physics12. The lists also provide the academics’ dates of birth, gender and 
university, as well as their rank in 2004/2005 and seniority in these ranks. For all 
individuals who in 2004/2005 were at the bottom rank of the academic ladder 
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(namely, MCF in France and RU in Italy) we thus know when they were recruited 
in such position; for all those who in the same year occupied a higher position (PR 
in France, PA or PO in Italy), we know when they were promoted to such position, 
but we ignore when they were recruited (as MCF or RU) or first promoted to 
lesser ranks.  
We gathered the information on scientific publications from the ISI Web of 
Science, from Thompson-Darwent, by matching the surnames and names of the 
physicists in the ministerial lists with the surnames and initial of names (as coded 
by ISI) for the authors of all articles published in physics journals going back to 
1975. We considered a total of 363 journals classified as mainly physics journals in 
the ISI records and with a minimum reputation as defined by an average five year 
impact factor of at least 0.5 13 . This list of journals includes all the main 
international journals specialised in physics and covers well all of its subfields14. 
Note that we have preferred not to consider generalist journals such as Science or 
Nature15. 
[TABLE 2 AND TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Such a collection strategy is the only one compatible with the publication 
data gathered from the Web of Science, but it generates problems of homonymy 
for the small group of physicists with the same surnames and initial of names in 
the ministerial lists, as well as for those with very common surnames. Ignoring 
these problems may lead to over-estimating the productivity of these physicists. In 
other cases homonyms can be found in the original ministerial databases, so that it 
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is impossible to correctly attribute papers. Therefore after some trials we finally 
dropped from our search all homonyms in the ministerial lists and all physicists 
with an apparent productivity record far too high for being credible, and with 
quite common surnames. These choices resulted in dropping about 3% of 
surnames from the original lists, leaving us with 2151 French physicists (instead of 
2211) and 1769 Italians (instead of 1816) 16. Note also that unless one would think 
that the spelling of surnames could in some way be related to the scientific 
productivity, cleaning our study sample from homonyms should not introduce 
any biases in our econometric results. 
Looking at our publications data, we found that about 3% (52) of the 
academic physicists in Italy and about 11% (235) of the French ones have no 
articles at all before and after recruitment or promotion, and hence a computed 
zero productivity throughout their observed careers. This significant difference 
could reflect the French academics’ tendency to write much more than Italians also 
in journals not included in the ISI Web of Science; or by a higher share, in France, 
of academics involved nearly exclusively in teaching, and/or administrative, 
advising and consulting activities. Given the lack of specific data for investigating 
why these “zero-productive” physicists self-select as “non researchers”, we 
thought it was better to simply leave them out from our analysis17. Our final study 
sample is thus made of 1916 French and 1717 Italian academic physicists, for 
which have a corpus of respectively 44100 and 52919 articles published from 1975 
up to 2005 in 363 physics journals. Table 3 gives the number of physicists in France 
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and Italy, active in 2004-2005, by gender and rank in the overall sample (before 
cleaning) and in our study sample. All the statistics and econometric estimates 
reported in the following sections of this paper are obtained from our study 
sample.  
4.2 Specification and estimation problems and solutions 
Our data constitute an unbalanced panel, where individual physicists are 
observed from  year T0 to 2005. For most scientists, year T0 coincides with the year 
of their first recorded publication; alternatively, for the oldest scientists, year T0 
coincides with 1975, the first year for which any publication record is available in 
our version of ISI-Web of Science; finally, for the few MCFs and RUs without any 
recorded publication before their known year of recruitment, T0 coincides with the 
latter.  
To assess sensibly and with reasonable confidence the effects of the various 
determinants of scientific productivity, we have to worry about three major kinds 
of interrelated specifications errors: selectivity, endogeneity, and unobserved 
(correlated) individual heterogeneity. All three are potential sources of estimation 
biases, as well as of uncertainty regarding the proper meaning and correct 
interpretation of our estimates. We have tried to take of care of them in a specific 
and particularly cautious way. 
First, we have considered five productivity regressions, both in terms of 
quantity and quality, one for each position in the academic ranking of the two 
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countries (PR and MCF in France; RU, PA, and PO in Italy); each of these 
regression exercises is conducted on the subsamples of physicists who had 
reached these ranks in 2004-2005, restricted to the years after their promotion to 
the rank. Our estimated impacts of productivity determinants are thus conditional 
on rank. This helps in controlling for selectivity and endogeneity as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity of physicists across ranks. We could have tried to 
estimate only two productivity regressions, one for each country, with rank as an 
explanatory variable (possibly interacted with other explanatory variables). Even 
putting aside the difficulty that we do not exactly know the full career history of 
professors before they were promoted, this would have been a more risky 
alternative, and a more difficult one since rank is endogenously determined and 
would have to be instrumented18 
Second, we estimate three selection probit equations accounting for the 
individual physicist probability of promotion from respectively MCF to PR, RU to 
PA and PA to PO. These equations are specified jointly with the corresponding 
productivity regressions as three generalized Tobit models, one for each of the 
professor ranks. To estimate consistently such Tobit models we have simply relied 
on Heckman’s two-step method, where the probit equation is estimated in the first 
step, and the productivity equation estimated in the second step including as an 
additional explanatory variable in the equation the inverse Mill’s ratio of the 
probability of promotion as predicted by the probit equation (Heckman, 1979; 
Dubin and Rivers, 1989; Wooldridge, 2002) 19 . Besides providing interesting 
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information per se on the determinants of promotion, estimating jointly a model of 
promotion and productivity helps controlling for selectivity, endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity.20 
Last, we also control for individual heterogeneity in both the promotion 
and productivity equations by introducing past productivity variables. In our 
analysis, individual heterogeneity mainly corresponds to individual characteristics 
such as ability and motivation. These are not directly observable, but have a major 
impact on individual performance. In so far as these individual characteristics are 
mostly permanent, they are bound to be strongly correlated with past productivity. 
Thus the presence of past productivity in the promotion and current productivity 
equations will take care of the most likely unobserved heterogeneity biases, if not 
fully at least to a large extent.21 
4.3 The determinants of promotion and scientific productivity 
Table 4 lists all the variables we consider for our econometric exercise. The 
latter requires estimating two equations: a selection equation in which the 
dependent variable is promotion of the scientist to the present position (PO, PA, 
PR), with past scientific productivity as the key explanatory variable; and a 
productivity equation in which the dependent variable is productivity, for all 
scientists in the same position. Each estimation exercise of the productivity 
equation is run twice, for two different dependent variables that measure 
respectively the quantity and quality of the scientific productivity of each 
individual scientist: 
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- Quantity: log(1 + number of articles in year t) 
- Quality: log(1 + average 5-year impact factor of journals with articles in year t) 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
We do not correct the number of articles, and the related quality measure, 
by the number of co-authors of each article; that is, we do not try to capture the 
individual scientist’s contribution to the article. We have two reasons for doing so. 
First, almost all articles in physics are co-authored, often by quite a large number 
of scientists. Papers written in isolation or by a few authors may be either 
theoretical ones or, if applied, they may reflect the isolation of their authors from 
the rest of the scientific community, rather than a larger individual contribution. 
Introducing arbitrary corrections according to the number of authors would have 
meant giving greater weight to theoretical papers or, possibly, to papers by 
peripheral authors. Instead, we control for the productivity of co-authors before t, 
which we expect to be correlated to the number of papers at time t22. 
The key explanatory variables in both the selection and productivity equation 
are related to the scientists’ age, the historical conditions of the academic labour 
market at the time of their recruitment or promotion, and time trends in 
productivity23. Additionally, promotion is explained by productivity, which enters 
the regression through two distinct variables: Quantity flow and Quality flow. These 
are the average number of papers published by the scientist between t-4 and t-2, 
and the related average value of the five year impact factor of journals24. Finally, 
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promotion is also a function of Academics per year, which is the number of 
individuals who achieved promotion in year t. 
Introducing age, cohort, and historical time in the promotion or the 
productivity equation creates the identification problem discussed by Hall et al. 
(2005). In particular, it is impossible to take simultaneously into account age, time 
and birth cohorts, one variable being a linear combination of the other two (age = 
year – birth cohort). In line with Hall et al. (2005) we attack this problem by using a 
semi-parametric model in which these effects enter linearly, and are represented 
by variables the least affected by identification problems. 
First, we do not consider birth cohorts, but only entry cohorts. That is, our 
Cohort dummies refer to the scientists’ years of entry in the academic workforce, 
namely the first year in which the individual scientist published an article or, if the 
scientist does not have publications before last promotion, the date of last 
promotion. This is similar to the approach used by Levin and Stephan (1991) 
which define as cohort the year in which a scientist received her PhD. It also 
captures more precisely than the year of birth the influence of changes in the 
importance of research fields or legislation on a cohort’s productivity. The entry 
cohort dummies are interacted with a full set of Period dummies that refer to 
calendar years; in other words, our semi-parametric model includes a dummy 
variable for each cohort-period combination (Cohort x Period). 
In addition, we estimate the impact of being recruited or promoted in 1980 
in Italy and 1985 in France. We expect scientists belonging to these recruitment 
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waves to display, other things being equal, lower productivity levels than 
scientists from all other cohorts, due to lack of selective pressure. Notice that the 
share of scientists recruited/promoted as RU, PA, and PO in 1980 in Italy and as 
MCF and PR in 1985 in France account for respectively 34%, 52%, 19%, 20% and 
13% of the observations in the productivity regression samples (see Appendix 
Table 2 and 3), and therefore they represent a substantial share of the academics 
active in 200525. In both the selections and the productivity equation we identify 
these scientists with the Wave 1980 and Wave 1985 dummy variables. Besides, in 
the selection equation, we control for the ease of entry into academia by counting, 
in each year t, the number of scientists promoted in that year and still active in the 
same rank in 2005 (Academics per year). 
As for the scientist’s age, we address the above-mentioned identification 
problem by using age groups; more precisely, we introduce in both the selection 
and the productivity equations five Age dummy variables, representing ten-years 
age-intervals of our scientists (see Table 4)26. Our expectation is to find a negative 
impact of scientist’s age on productivity (Levin and Stephan, 1991; Hall et al., 2005). 
On the contrary, when considered as a determinant of promotion (selection 
equation), Age is expected to have a positive impact: the older the scientists, the 
higher their chances to be promoted (as in Long, 1993). 
In both the selection and productivity equations we test for gender effects 
(Gender=1 for women). In our sample, women represent respectively the 23% and 
27% of the French MCFs and Italian RUs. At the same time they are the 7% and 6% 
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of the French PRs  and Italian POs. The literature typically indicates that women 
publish less than men (Levin and Stephan, 1998). However this result often 
depends on cross-sectional data that cannot control for individual heterogeneity.  
Moreover, in both the selection and productivity equations, we control for 
the scientist’s specific research fields through a set of dummies reflecting ministerial 
classifications of disciplines (Field 28 and Field 30 for France; Field FIS/01, Field 
FIS/02, and Field FIS/03 for Italy). We expect the probability to be recruited or 
promoted to be field-specific for two reasons. First, resources to hire new 
employees are not distributed homogeneously among all the disciplines. Second, 
some disciplines could be more prolific in terms of new discoveries and research 
paths, thus attracting more junior scientists. As for productivity, this can also be 
affected by the scientist’s specific field of research, due to differences in the 
resources needed to produce a paper.  
In order to characterize the work environment in the productivity equations, 
we also control for our scientists’ relationship with other members of the scientific 
community. First, we consider the past productivity of each scientist’s co-authors 
in year t (Co-author’s quantity and quality). The co-authors we consider are only 
those who also belong to our sample (that is, we ignore all co-authors who are 
neither French nor Italian physicists for which we have no publication data). Their 
overall Quantity and Quality is calculated over the interval [t-3, t-1] and divided by 
the number of years in the interval. We expect both variables to bear positive 
effects on the scientist’s productivity, however measured, to the extent that 
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working contacts with other productive individuals provide access to knowledge 
and information27.  
Second, we consider the size and geographical reach of the projects in 
which our scientists are involved. We produce four time-varying and mutually 
exclusive dummy variables that summarize information on the number of co-
authors and their addresses, as reported by the ISI publication records (in this case 
we consider all co-authors, not only the French and Italian scientists)28. In order to 
do so we consider the scientist’s publications from t-3 to t-1. The variable Large 
Project dummy, then, takes value one if the scientist has at least one article (among 
this set of lagged publications) with 30 or more authors29. All these large projects 
are international, that is for all papers with 30 or more co-authors, the ISI records 
report several non-Italian and non-French addresses. Alternatively, in case the 
scientist’s lagged publications do not come from any large project, we check 
whether there is at least one publication resulting from an international project, 
although of a smaller scale. As a result the Small_project_with_foreign_co-author 
dummy takes value one if the scientist has no publications with 30 or more 
authors over [t-3,t-1], but she has at least one publication with at least a foreign co-
author. 
 A third dummy variable, named Small_project_with_only_national_co-authors 
signals that none of the co-authors has a foreign affiliation30. Finally since in many 
cases the information on affiliation and addresses reported by ISI is incomplete, 
we control for the possibility that none of the scientist’s articles contains 
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information on its authors’ affiliation or addresses (Small_project_with_co-
authors_of_unknown_affiliations dummy). Scientists with no publications over [t-3, 
t-1] constitute the reference case. 
In order to capture unobserved heterogeneity in the productivity equations, 
we control for the scientist’s productivity before promotion, that is the yearly 
average quantity and quality since entry year (Quantity before promotion; Quantity 
before promotion).  
Finally, we control for problems arising from data design. First, in the 
productivity equation we deal with the left truncation problem due to the 
unavailability of information on publications before 1975. To this end, a dummy 
variable Promotion before 1975 is inserted, which takes value one for scientists who 
reached the present position before the first year of observation. As for the 
promotion equation, we simply do not consider observations affected by this 
problem. Second, we deal with the presence of zero values in all measures of 
quantity and quality when used as explanatory variables by inserting a number of 
dummies which take value 1 in case of absence of any publication31. 
Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3 report summary statistics for all the regressors, 
by rank. 
 
5. Results and discussion 
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In what follows we comment separately the results from the estimation of the 
selection and productivity equations. In the case of RU and MCF we do not see 
enough history of the individual to explain the promotion with a probit model. For 
example, many RUs and MCFs published very few or no articles before being 
promoted to their present rank; and the latter may have been achieved mainly 
thanks to the candidates’ graduate work or educational attainments, which we 
also do not observe.  
5.1 Promotion equation 
Results from the selection equation for Italy and France are reported in 
Table 5. Cohort-period interactions are included in the estimation, but not 
displayed. As expected, the promotion probability of both Italian and French 
scientists increases with age, which confirms the role of seniority in both academic 
systems. Note however that for full professors in both countries (PO in Italy and 
PR in France), the estimated coefficient for Age group 5 (that is, for academics who 
are more than 60 years old) is smaller than the coefficient for Age group 4. This 
suggests a non-monotonic effect of seniority on promotion probability 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The positive sign and absolute size of the coefficients for Wave 1980 and 
Wave 1985 confirm that in those two years a scientist’s chances of being promoted 
were much higher than at any other time in recent history. This result holds 
despite we also controlled for the (positive) effect of Academics per year on the 
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probability of promotion. For example, the estimated marginal effect for Academics 
per year in the PO equation suggests that one more PO promoted in year t gives 
any (Italian) candidate to the same position 0.23% more chances of success (1.2% 
for PA and 0.46% for PR). On top of this, being a candidate to the same position in 
1980 meant a 40% higher probability of success (38% also for PA and 18%, in 1985, 
for PR). Overall, in 1980, 62 individuals reached the PO position, for a combined 
increase in the probability of promotion of around 54%, other things being equal 
(40% from the Wave 1980 dummy, plus 62x0.23% from Academics per year). 
The Gender effect is strongly negative in both countries and confirms that, 
other things being equal, women in physics face more difficulties than men to be 
promoted. Field effects are also significant, with some relevant differences across 
ranks.32  
As for productivity, its effect on the probability of being promoted is 
captured by the two variables Quality flow and Quantity flow, whose estimated 
coefficients differ across countries. In Italy, promotion seems to be affected  largely 
by quantity, the impact of quality being negligible for promotions to PO but 
negative to PA position33. In France quality, but not quantity, affects positively and 
significantly the probability of promotion to PR34.  
5.2 Productivity equation  
Results from the productivity equations for Italy and France are reported in 
Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6 the dependent variable is quantity while Table 7 refers to 
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quality. As expected, the age of academics has a negative impact on both the 
quantity and quality of articles published. In all equations, this is captured by the 
age group coefficients, which are all negative and significant (with the exception 
of Age group 1) and increasingly larger when moving from Age group 3 to Age group 
535.  
[TABLE 6 AND TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Elaborations on the estimated coefficients in Table 6 tell us that over-60 
Italian POs produce around 2.25 articles per year less than their 30-to-40 year old 
peers. A similar comparison suggests that over-60 French PR produce 0.65 articles 
per year less than their younger peers36. As for quality (Table 7), Italian POs seem 
the most affected by age, with over-60s exhibiting a loss of average impact factor 
per year equal to 1.99. Since  we observe the productivity conditional to the 
scientist’s ranking in 2005, our estimates capture on one side the life cycle effect, as 
discussed in section 4.3; but on the other side, and only for RUs, PAs and MCFs, 
they capture the effect of less productive scientists that are not promoted and 
remain at lower academic ranks.  
Gender impacts differently in Italy and in France, and across academic ranks. 
With reference to quantity estimates in Table 6, we observe that Italy exhibits a 
negative gender effect only for RU: Italian ricercatrici publish 0.27 papers less than 
their male peers, per year; on the contrary, women in PA or PO position are not 
less productive than their male equivalents. As for France, we observe a negative 
gender effect on quantity both for PR and for MCF, where women produce 
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respectively 0.26 and 0.13 papers less than men, per year. Results for quality are 
similar, the women’s gap in average impact factor per year being:  -0.49 for PR, -
0.24 for MCF, and -0.39 for RU. In the absence of additional data, we can provide 
intuitive explanations for such results. In particular, we notice that, for Italy, the 
existence of a gender effect only for the most junior position (RU) is consistent 
with the possibility that gender matters more at the early career stages, when 
familiar engagements may also be demanding. Thus, a self-selection process may 
take place, by which only the best or most motivated researchers try to access the 
higher ranks, at which the gender effect appears to be less remarkable or even not 
significant. If this was the correct interpretation, we need then to explain why we 
observe a gender effect also at the senior level of French PR. In this respect we note 
that women in France are 10% of PR (as opposed to 6% of Italian PO). Moreover, 
going back to the selection equation (Table 5), we notice that the negative gender 
effect on promotion is smaller for PR relatively to PO. One possibility is therefore 
that French women face less difficulties in the promotion to full professorship 
(thanks, for example, to the first centralized step managed by CNU), which may 
explain why we observe the negative gender to persist at the top academic rank. 
The estimated coefficient of the Wave 1980 and Wave 1985 dummies is 
negative and significant in the quantity model, for all positions (with the exception 
of French PR; see Table 6), while it is still negative, but never significant in the 
quality model (with the exception of Italian RU where it is significant and PR and 
PA where is positive; see Table 7). As for quantity, POs promoted to such rank in 
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1980 publish 0.20 articles less per year than other POs. Similarly, PAs and RUs last 
promoted in 1980 publish respectively 0.19 and 0.35 articles less per year than 
colleagues last promoted in more recent years. The effect for France is still 
noticeable, but less pronounced: MCFs who were recruited in 1985 (and never 
promoted to PR) produce 0.05 articles less than other MCFs, per year. Bearing in 
mind that we do not observe how many scientists, among those who entered the 
academic system as RU or MCF in 1980 and 1985, have been subsequently 
promoted to higher positions (as opposed to having retired or left Italy), the 
interpretation of our results may be as follows: the 1980 and 1985 big recruitment 
waves in the two countries filled up the RU, PA, and MCF positions with less 
productive scientists, who did not progress much further in their careers, and are 
now responsible for the negative signs we observe in Table 6 and (for RU) in Table 
7. We can estimate the total scientific productivity loss due to the entry wave of 
1980 in Italy, where the effect is stronger, comparing the total number of papers 
published by scientists promoted in these entry cohorts, with the estimated 
number of papers published by scientists from other entry cohorts, other things 
being equal. This exercise suggests that the 62 Italian POs promoted in 1980 have 
published about 314 articles less than what expected by similar POs from other 
cohorts, over the same years of activity. Similar calculations suggest a production 
gap of 785 articles by PAs and of 639 articles by RUs from the 1980 wave, for a 
total scientific loss of around 1738 articles. Our calculations may under-estimate 
the effects of the massive entry waves, since they are based on a sample which 
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includes only academics who published at least one article since 1975. A large 
share of the French and Italian unproductive scientists, excluded from the 
regression sample, comes precisely from the 1985 and 1980 waves [respectively 
17% (40/235) and 36.5% (19/52)], so that their inclusion would have increased 
further the size of the estimated coefficients for the two wave dummies37.  
These figures suggest that the percentage of unproductive scientists over all 
scientists hired during the 1980 and 1985 waves is at least two (for MCF) or three 
times higher (for PA and RU) than the same percentage for the rest of the sample38.  
Some descriptive statistics help understanding why the “wave effect” 
appears to be stronger in Italy than in France. In Italy, over 10% (62/588) of PO, 
26% (166/618) of PA and 14% (73/511) of RU active in 2005 were promoted to such 
positions in 1980. In France, only less than 8% (55/705) of PR and 10% (121/1212) of 
MCF reached their present position in 1985. In other words, the 1980 wave in Italy 
was bigger and produced more enduring effect than its French equivalent. As for 
Italian RUs, this effect is also visible for the quality-based measure of productivity. 
As explained in the previous section, we control for the individuals’ 
unobservable heterogeneity by means of lagged measures of productivity 
(Quantity before promotion and Quality before promotion). As expected, all such 
controls bear a positive and significant sign (the only exception being the negative 
sign of the impact of past quality-productivity on current quantity-productivity in 
the case of PO).  
 36 
Productive co-authors impact positively on individual scientists’ 
productivity. For quantity measures of productivity, estimates in Table 6 suggest 
that Italian PO and French PR and MCF produce 0.08, 0.06 and  0.18 extra articles 
per year for every additional article produced by their co-authors over the three 
preceding years. The marginal effect of co-authors’ quality on the scientist’s 
quality output per year is positive for all ranks and countries, and it ranges 
between 0.37 for Italian RU and 0.53  for PR.  
Involvement in large and/or international projects affects strongly a 
scientist’s yearly productivity. This is especially true for Italian POs, where the 
dummy Large project produces a marginal effect on quantity of more than 5.5 
articles per year. Similar results hold also for PAs and RUs, whose productivity  is 
increased significantly by participation to Large project (4.40 and 3.43 more articles 
per year; the reference group is given by scientists with no publications in the 
three years before t). The effect of Large project for France, albeit high if compared 
to the effect of other covariates, is weaker than in Italy, the marginal effects for PRs 
and MCFs being respectively equal to 4.63 and 3.33. Even quality is affected by 
participation to large international projects, with increases in the average impact 
factor per year comprised between 3.54 (for MCF) and 9.09 (for PO). Scientists who 
are not involved in large projects, but had at least one foreign co-author in the 
three years before t, also have larger quantity and quality scores than the reference 
group (but lower than their peers participating to large projects). Italian POs with 
dummy Small_project_with_foreign_co-authors equal to one, for example, publish 
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2.41 more papers per year than the reference group. On the other hand, POs with 
participation to Small_project_with_only_national_co-authors publish 1.50 papers 
more than the reference group. Similar results hold for all position in both 
countries. 
Controls for field effects also prove significant. Italian POs belonging to 
Fisica sperimentale (Field Fis/01) and Fisica teorica, modelli e metodi matematici (Field 
Fis/02) publish respectively 0.46 and 0.65 articles less than colleagues from Fisica 
della materia (Field Fis/03), per year. The quality of the publications is also lower. In 
France, MCFs belonging to Milieux dilués et optique (Field 30) publish more and 
higher quality articles if compared to Milieux denses et matériaux (Field 28). 
Tables 6 and 7 show also the estimated inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) 
produced by the Heckman procedure to correct for the problem of selection bias. 
Its negative sign means that the probability of not being promoted affects 
negatively the individual scientific productivity. The coefficient is significant for 
PR, PO and PA in the quantity regressions and for PR and PO in the quality 
regressions. Lack of significance for  PA in the quality regression means that the 
two equations, selection and productivity, could have been estimated separately, 
without any kind of correction for endogeneity of the academic rank. 
 
6. Conclusions 
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In this paper we have investigated the determinants of scientific 
productivity for a sample comprising most of the academic physicists active in 
French and Italian universities in 2004-2005. We have performed this analysis both 
conditional on being in an assistant or professorial position (MCF and PR in 
France and RU, PA and PO in Italy) and together with a joint analysis of the 
determinants of promotion to professor (from MCF to PR in France and RU to PA 
and PA to PO in Italy). We consider this approach to be more informative than 
most alternatives, as well as better at addressing the interrelated econometric 
problems of endogeneity, selectivity, and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Our estimates of promotion equations show that the probability of a French 
or Italian physicist to be promoted professor increases with age until he/she 
reaches his/her sixties. Other things being equal, we also find that such probability 
is significantly lower for  women. In Italy  promotion is influenced by the quantity 
of past publications (quantity-productivity lagged flow), and in France, it is 
influenced by their quality (quality-productivity lagged flow). In both academic 
systems we observe big recruitments waves, in 1980 and 1985, which affect 
significantly the probability of promotion. 
In the productivity equations we show that the age of academics has a 
negative impact on the quantity and quality of articles published by French PR 
and Italian PO publications. For the other academic ranks the age effect is mixed 
with the other effect of not being promoted, due to the database design. French 
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MCFs and Italian PAs and RUs are characterized by a strong negative impact of 
age.  
As for gender effect on productivity, Italian women at the early stage of 
their careers (for example RU) are penalized in their publication activity. However, 
if Italian women manage to be promoted to higher ranks, then they publish as 
much as their male colleagues. On the contrary, in France we observe a negative 
gender effects across all ranks. We find evidence that the work environment is 
very important for individual scientists’ productivity. In particular being involved 
in large projects, or at least having an international collaboration, has a strong and 
positive effect on quantity and quality of published articles  
Finally we show that the big recruitment and promotion waves of 1980 and 
1985 had negative and lasting effects on the average scientific productivity of the 
two countries, especially for Italy. Such big waves came after a prolonged spell 
with no recruitment of new scientists and few promotions, and were the result of 
policy provisions aimed at providing permanent positions for many scientists 
with temporary assignments. Many of the physicists recruited in these years 
appear not to have progressed much in their careers, and to have been persistently 
less productive than the average physicists of the same rank, recruited or 
promoted in other years.  
Our results on age, gender and the importance of promotion probability 
confirm many of the results found in the literature. Findings on the enduring 
negative effects of en masse recruitment, on the contrary, are more specific of 
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France and, most notably, Italy. They suggest that tight governmental control over 
academic careers, such as when governments can prevent universities from 
recruiting or promoting scientists for a long time, and then intervene with sudden 
and massive waves of job creation, can create persistent damage to the national 
academic system. Although never equalled in terms of size, such provisions are 
still typical of the French and Italian systems, which makes our results particularly 
relevant for the ongoing reforms in those two countries. 
 41 
  
 
 
Figures 
 42 
Figure 1: Rank distribution of physicists active in 2004-05 in France (MCF, PR) and in Italy (RU, 
PA, PO) 
 
  Source: Authors elaboration on ministerial records 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of physicists active in 2004-05 in France by year of recruitment (MCF) or 
year of last promotion (PR) 
 
Source: Authors elaboration on ministerial records 
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Figure 3: Distribution of physicists active in 2004-05 in Italy by year of recruitment (RU) or year 
of last promotion (PA; PO) 
 
Source: Authors elaboration on ministerial records 
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Table 1: Disciplinary fields and ranks 
 French Universities  Italian Universities  
Fields  
 
• 28 Milieux denses et 
matériaux  
• 30 Milieux dilués et optique  
• Fis/01 Fisica Sperimentale  
• Fis/02 Fisica Teorica, Modelli E Metodi Matematici 
• Fis/03 Fisica Della Materia  
Ranks  • (PR) Professor 
• (MCF) Maitre de Conference 
• (RU) Ricercatore Universitario  
• (PA) Professore Associato  
• (PO) Professore Ordinario  
 
Table 2: Number of physicists active in 2004-05 in France and Italy by cohort of  
birth and rank 
  COHORT 
 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s Total 
France-Ranks:       
PR 23 423 179 153 3 781 
% by cohort 2.94 54.16 22.92 19.59 0.38 100 
MCF 12 341 134 586 357 1430 
% by cohort 0.84 23.85 9.37 40.98 24.97 100 
      2211 
Italy-Ranks:       
PO 168 301 137 16  622 
% by cohort 27.01 48.39 22.03 2.57  100 
PA 72 222 177 187 3 661 
% by cohort 10.89 33.59 26.78 28.29 0.45 100 
RU 1 54 115 301 62 533 
% by cohort 0.19 10.13 21.58 56.47 11.63 100 
           1816 
Total 276 1341 742 1243 425 4027 
Note: Computed on French and Italian overall samples (before cleaning) -- see Section 4. 
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Table 3: Number of physicists in France and Italy, active in 2004-05 by gender and rank in 
overall sample (before cleaning) and on study sample  
Overall sample 
 FRANCE   ITALY 
 Women Man Total   Women Men Total 
MCF 410 1020 1430  RU 132 401 533 
PR 80 701 781  PA 102 559 661 
         PO 40 582 622 
Total 490 1721 2211  Total 274 1542 1816 
Note: Computed on overall French and Italian samples (i.e. before cleaning). 
 
Study sample 
 FRANCE   ITALY 
 Women Men Total   Women Men Total 
MCF 299 912 1211  RU 124 387 511 
PR 50 655 705  PA 93 525 618 
         PO 38 550 588 
Total 349 1567 1916  Total 255 1462 1717 
Note: Computed on French and Italian study samples (i.e. after cleaning for homonymy and “zero-productive’ 
academics). 
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Table 4: Dependent and explanatory variables in promotion and productivity equations 
VARIABLE DEFINITION 
 
Dependent variables in promotion and productivity equations 
Promotion Step indicator for being promoted in year t(p): =0 if promoted [i.e., t>=t(p)], and =1 if 
not promoted [i.e., t<t(p)]. 
Quantity-productivity  Logarithm of the numbers of articles published in year t, plus 1  
Quality-productivity Logarithm of the average five years impact factor in year t for the journals in which 
articles have been published in that year, plus 1 
Explanatory  variables in the promotion equations only: 
Quantity-productivity 
 lagged flow 
Logarithm of the average number of articles in the three years t-2,t-3 and t-4, plus 1 
Quality-productivity 
 lagged flow 
Logarithm of the average five years impact factor of the journals in which articles have 
been published in the three years t-2, t-3 and t-4, plus 1. 
Zero lagged flow Dummy=1 when Quantity flow=Quality flow=0 (and =0 if not). 
Academics per year Estimates of the number of academics promoted in year t as PR, PA or PO. 
Explanatory  variables in the productivity equations only: 
Quantity-productivity 
 before promotion 
Logarithm of the average number of articles per year published before the year of 
recruitment or last promotion, plus 1  
Quality-productivity 
 before promotion 
Logarithm of the average impact factor of the journals in which articles have been 
published before the year of recruitment or last promotion, plus 1. 
Co-authors quantity Logarithm of the moving average of co-authors’ number of articles (with other 
scientists than the author) in the three years t-1, t-2 and t-3, plus 1. 
Co-authors quality Logarithm of 1 plus the moving average of average impact factor of the articles 
published by the co-authors (with other scientists than the author) in the three years t-
1, t-2 and t-3, plus 1. 
Co-authors quantity and 
quality zeros 
Dummy=1 when co-authors quantity is 0 (and=0 if not); and Dummy=1 when co-authors 
quality is 0 (and =0 if not). 
Co-authors number and 
affiliation dummies 
Large Project Dummy=1 if in the three years before t (t-1,t-2 and t-3) scientists have at 
least one article with 30 or more co-authors (and=0 if not);  
Small Project with Foreign co-authors Dummy=1 if in the three years before t (t-1,t-2 and t-
3) scientists have no articles with 30 or more co-authors and have at least one article 
with an address indicating at least one foreign co-authors (and=0 if not); 
Small Project with only national co-authors Dummy=1 if in the three years before t (t-1,t-2 
and t-3) scientists have no articles with 30 or more co-authors and have no articles with 
addresses indicating foreign co-authors (and=0 if not);  
Small Project with co-authors of unknown affiliations Dummy=1 if in the three years before 
t (t-1,t-2 and t-3) scientists have no articles with 30 or more co-authors and have only 
articles with missing addresses (and=0 if not).  
Zero in three preceding 
years 
Dummy=1 when scientists published 0 articles in the three years t-1, t-2 and t-3 before 
year of observation (and=0 if not). 
Zeros before promotion Dummy=1 when Quantity before promotion=Quality before promotion=0 (and =0 if not). 
Zeros after promotion Dummy=1 when scientists published 0 articles after recruitment or last promotion 
(and=0 if not). 
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Table 4 (continued): Dependent and explanatory variables in promotion and productivity 
equations  
 
Explanatory  variables in both the promotion and productivity equations: 
Wave 1980/1985 Dummy=1 if academic experienced last promotion in 1980 in Italy or in 1985 in 
France 
Gender Gender dummy variable: Female=1, Male=0 
Age group dummies Dummy= 1 if academic belongs to a specific age class: age group 1 (age<30), age 
group 2 (30<=age<40), age group 3 (40<=age<50), age group 4 (50<=age<60), age 
group 5 (age>=60) 
Field  
(28, 30, FIS01, FIS02, 
FIS03) 
Country specific fields of affiliation of physicists in French and Italian universities. 
In France 28= Milieux denses et matériaux and 20= Milieux dilués et optique. In Italy 
Fis01= Fisica Sperimentale, Fis02= Fisica Teorica and Fis03= Fisica Della Materia. 
(Year) and (cohort of entry) 
interactions dummies 
Interactions between dummies for year of publication and cohort of entry defined 
as the first year we see the scientist publish (or in case of zero publications before 
entering or being promoted  the year of entry or of promotion) 
Promotion before 1975 Dummy variable for the (small) subset of professors promoted before 1975. The 
inclusion of this dummy in the productivity equations controls for the fact that the 
publication history of this subset of professors is unknown between promotion 
and 1975. Its inclusion in the promotion equations is equivalent to eliminating 
them in the estimation of these equations (the dependent step indicator of being 
promoted is always equal to one for them). 
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   Table 5: Probit equations for professor promotion 
 
PR (FR) PO (IT) PA (IT) 
Quantity flow 0.018 0.048*** 0.059*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.0074) 
Quality flow 0.060*** -0.0050 -0.025*** 
 
(0.011) (0.014) (0.0088) 
Zero flow 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 
 
(0.013) (0.022) (0.0079) 
Academics per year 0.0046** 0.0023*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.0018) (0.00090) (0.00061) 
Wave 1985 (FR)/ Wave 1980 (IT) 0.18*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 
 
(0.0095) (0.0084) (0.0097) 
Gender -0.11*** -0.15*** -0.068*** 
 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.012) 
Age group 1 n.r. n.r. n.r. 
    Age group 3 0.27*** 0.50*** 0.15*** 
 
(0.012) (0.018) (0.0093) 
Age group 4 0.37*** 0.68*** 0.22*** 
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.0097) 
Age group 5 0.23*** 0.56*** n.r. 
 
(0.010) (0.011) 
 Field 30 (FR)/Fis01 (IT) 0.022** 0.0020 0.029*** 
 
(0.0092) (0.013) (0.0088) 
Field Fis02 (IT) 
 
0.13*** 0.0090 
  
(0.014) (0.011) 
Constant - - - 
    Observations 14094 14114 12165 
Number of physicists 705 588 618 
See Table 4 for the precise definitions of the variables. The coefficients given in the Table are the marginal effects. Their 
standard errors are given in parentheses, and the corresponding P-values if less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 are respectively 
denoted by ***, ** and *.The equation include controls for the (year) and (cohort of entry) interactions and for the 
promotion before 1975 dummy variable; their coefficients are not reported in the Table.  
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Table 6. Quantity-productivity equation. 
  PR(FR) MCF(FR) PO(IT) PA(IT) RU(IT) 
VARIABLES Heckman OLS Heckman Heckman OLS 
            
Quantity before promotion 0.45*** 0.33*** 0.57*** 0.37*** 0.48*** 
 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) 
Quality before promotion 0.080*** 0.058*** -0.094*** 0.00038 0.013 
 
(0.020) (0.012) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) 
Co-authors quantity 0.036* 0.13*** 0.047** 0.0095 -0.041 
 
(0.019) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (0.025) 
Co-authors quality 0.069*** 0.028 0.018 0.036 -0.021 
 
(0.026) (0.021) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036) 
Co-authors zero Dummy -0.017 0.099** -0.13** -0.083 -0.27*** 
 
(0.053) (0.044) (0.060) (0.058) (0.077) 
Large Project Dummy 1.09*** 1.14*** 1.13*** 1.18*** 0.96*** 
 
(0.049) (0.038) (0.039) (0.032) (0.045) 
Small Project with Foreign co-authors Dummy 0.55*** 0.43*** 0.68*** 0.55*** 0.39*** 
 
(0.023) (0.015) (0.035) (0.025) (0.037) 
Small project with only National co-authors Dummy 0.33*** 0.21*** 0.39*** 0.34*** 0.18*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.035) (0.024) (0.035) 
Small Project with co-authors of unknown affiliations 
Dummy 
0.22*** 0.14*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.082 
 
(0.035) (0.024) (0.075) (0.050) (0.072) 
Wave 1985 (FR)/ Wave 1980 (IT) 0.028 -0.032** -0.061** -0.080*** -0.14*** 
 
(0.024) (0.016) (0.027) (0.025) (0.047) 
Gender -0.11*** -0.079*** 0.047 -0.024 -0.11*** 
 
(0.029) (0.012) (0.038) (0.021) (0.021) 
Age group 1 
 
0.097** 
  
-0.015 
  
(0.043) 
  
(0.16) 
Age group 3 -0.19*** -0.060*** -0.42*** -0.11*** -0.078** 
 
(0.047) (0.020) (0.095) (0.034) (0.032) 
Age group 4 -0.26*** -0.11*** -0.64*** -0.27*** -0.25*** 
 
(0.061) (0.027) (0.11) (0.043) (0.057) 
Age group 5 -0.31*** -0.074* -0.77*** -0.38*** -0.40*** 
 
(0.066) (0.040) (0.12) (0.048) (0.12) 
Field 30 (FR)/Fis01 (IT) 0.0011 0.054*** -0.13*** 0.011 -0.013 
 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) 
Field Fis02 (IT) 
  
-0.20*** -0.039 -0.055** 
   
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027) 
Constant 0.19 0.37 0.46*** 0.056 0.26 
 
(0.18) (0.53) (0.16) (0.10) (0.25) 
rho -0.33 
 
-0.30 -0.27 
 lambda -0.20*** 
 
-0.21*** -0.17*** 
 standard error lambda (0.06) 
 
(0.047) (0.041) 
 Observations 14094 12057 14114 12165 5106 
Uncesnsored observation 9018 
 
8332 8089 
 Censored observations 5076 
 
5782 4076 
 Number of physicists 705 1211 588 618 511 
Sigma 0.61 
 
0.69 0.62 
 R-squared   0.344     0.526 
See Table 4 for the precise definitions of the variables. We control for the (year) and (cohort of entry) interactions 
dummies, for the Zero after promotion dummy variable and for the promotion before 1975 dummy variable, all three not 
reported in the Table. The Zero in preceding years is normalized to be the reference group for the co-authors number and 
affiliation dummies. Standard errors are given in parentheses, and P-values less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 are respectively 
denoted by *, ** and ***.  
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Table 7. Quality-productivity equation. 
  PR(FR) MCF(FR) PO(IT) PA(IT) RU(IT) 
VARIABLES Heckman OLS Heckman Heckman OLS 
 
          
Quantity before promotion 0.37*** 0.21*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029) 
Quality before promotion 0.34*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.093*** 0.11*** 
 
(0.027) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.030) 
Co-authors quantity -0.057** 0.067*** -0.027 -0.053** -0.083*** 
 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.032) 
Co-authors quality 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.036) (0.047) 
Co-authors zero Dummy 0.14** 0.32*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.052 
 
(0.071) (0.070) (0.067) (0.074) (0.099) 
Large Project Dummy 1.04*** 0.96*** 1.24*** 1.18*** 0.95*** 
 
(0.066) (0.061) (0.044) (0.041) (0.059) 
Small Project with Foreign co-authors Dummy 0.84*** 0.71*** 1.04*** 0.88*** 0.73*** 
 
(0.031) (0.024) (0.039) (0.032) (0.047) 
Small project with only National co-authors Dummy 0.61*** 0.43*** 0.72*** 0.58*** 0.46*** 
 
(0.032) (0.025) (0.039) (0.031) (0.045) 
Small Project with co-authors of unknown affiliations 
Dummy 
0.47*** 0.28*** 0.49*** 0.38*** 0.35*** 
 
(0.047) (0.038) (0.084) (0.064) (0.093) 
Wave 1985 (FR)/ Wave 1980 (IT) 0.075** -0.0039 -0.028 0.024 -0.18*** 
 
(0.032) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.061) 
Gender -0.15*** -0.11*** 0.021 -0.019 -0.10*** 
 (0.039) (0.019) (0.042) (0.027) (0.028) 
Age group 1 
 
0.16** 
  
-0.085 
  
(0.069) 
  
(0.20) 
Age group 3 -0.16** -0.090*** -0.17 -0.037 -0.065 
 
(0.063) (0.031) (0.11) (0.043) (0.042) 
Age group 4 -0.22*** -0.11** -0.34*** -0.15*** -0.27*** 
 
(0.081) (0.044) (0.12) (0.055) (0.074) 
Age group 5 -0.27*** -0.059 -0.45*** -0.31*** -0.55*** 
 
(0.088) (0.064) (0.13) (0.061) (0.15) 
Field 30 (FR)/Fis01 (IT) 0.029 0.076*** -0.15*** -0.071*** -0.081*** 
 
(0.020) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.032) 
Field Fis02 (IT) 
  
-0.094*** -0.073** -0.018 
   
(0.025) (0.031) (0.035) 
Constant -0.013 -0.070 -0.23 -0.13 0.13 
 
(0.24) (0.85) (0.18) (0.13) (0.32) 
rho -0.25 
 
-0.15 0.052 
 lambda -0.20*** 
 
-0.11** 0.040 
 standard error lambda (0.081) 
 
(0.052) (0.052) 
 Observations 14094 12057 14114 12165 5106 
Uncesnsored observation 9018 
 
8332 8089 
 Censored observations 5076 
 
5782 4076 
 Number of physicists 705 1211 588 618 511 
Sigma 0.81 
 
0.76 0.78 
 R-squared   0.288     0.402 
See Table 4 for the precise definitions of the variables. We control for the (year)x(cohort of entry) interactions dummies, 
for the Zero after promotion dummy variable and for the promotion before 1975 dummy variable, all three not reported in 
the Table. The Zero in preceding years is normalized to be the reference group for theco-authors number and affiliation 
dummies. Standard errors are given in parentheses, and P-values less than 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 are respectively denoted 
by *, ** and ***.  
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Appendix Table 1: Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables in promotion 
equations 
 PR (obs. 14094) PO (obs. 14114) PA (obs. 12165) 
 m
ea
n 
sd
 
m
in
 
m
ax
 
m
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n 
sd
 
m
in
 
m
ax
 
m
ea
n 
sd
 
m
in
 
m
ax
 
Promotion 0.64 0.48 0 1 0.59 0.49 0 1 0.66 0.47 0 1 
Quality flow 0.87 0.61 0 4.01 1.21 0.71 0 3.78 0.97 0.74 0 3.65 
Quantity flow 1.42 0.75 0 3.00 1.72 0.70 0 3.16 1.46 0.81 0 3.02 
Zero flow 0.14 0.35 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Academics per year 26.97 15.84 0 55 19.12 29.40 0 109 22.24 30.21 0 166 
Wave 1985 (FR)/ 
Wave 1980 (IT) 
0.10 0.30 0 1 0.12 0.32 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Gender 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.06 0.25 0 1 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Age group 1 0.01 0.08 0 1 0.00 0.07 0 1 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Age group 3 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Age group 4 0.29 0.45 0 1 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Age group 5 0.06 0.23 0 1 0.16 0.37 0 1 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Field 30 (FR)  0.30 0.46 0 1         
Fis01 (IT)     0.52 0.50 0 1 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Fis02 (IT)     0.23 0.42 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Promotion before 
1975 
0.02 0.14 0 1 0.05 0.22 0 1     
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Appendix Table 2: Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables in productivity 
equation for France 
 PR (obs. 9018) MCF (obs. 12057) 
   m
ea
n 
sd
 
m
in
 
m
ax
 
 
m
ea
n 
sd
 
m
in
 
m
ax
 
Productivity(Quantity)   0.81 0.75 0 4.26  0.48 0.64 0 4.89 
Productivity(Quality)  1.21 0.98 0 3.19  0.81 0.98 0 3.18 
Productivity(effort)  0.15 0.14 0 0.69  0.09 0.13 0 0.69 
Quantity before 
promotion  
0.81 0.47 0 2.82  0.60 0.44 0 2.81 
Quality before 
promotion  
1.63 0.65 0 2.73  1.34 0.74 0 3.11 
Co-authors quantity  0.58 0.75 0 4.04  0.48 0.72 0 4.19 
Co-authors quality  0.84 0.98 0 3.11  0.68 0.95 0 3.11 
Co-authors zero 
Dummy  
0.56 0.50 0 1  0.64 0.48 0 1 
Large Project Dummy  0.02 0.15 0 1  0.02 0.14 0 1 
Small Project with 
Foreign co-authors 
Dummy  
0.52 0.50 0 1  0.36 0.48 0 1 
Small project with only 
National co-authors 
Dummy  
0.24 0.43 0 1  0.23 0.42 0 1 
Small Project with co-
authors of unknown 
affiliations Dummy  
0.05 0.22 0 1  0.06 0.24 0 1 
Wave 1985 (FR)  0.13 0.33 0 1  0.20 0.40 0 1 
Gender  0.06 0.23 0 1  0.23 0.42 0 1 
Age group 1  0.00 0.00 0 0  0.02 0.13 0 1 
Age group 3  0.40 0.49 0 1  0.28 0.45 0 1 
Age group 4  0.43 0.50 0 1  0.21 0.40 0 1 
Age group 5  0.09 0.28 0 1  0.04 0.20 0 1 
Field 30 (FR)  0.29 0.46 0 1  0.34 0.47 0 1 
Zeros before promotion  0.09 0.29 0 1  0.15 0.36 0 1 
Promotion before 1975  0.03 0.18 0 1  0.00 0.00 0 0 
Zero after promotion  0.03 0.18 0 1  0.09 0.28 0 1 
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Appendix Table 3: Summary statistics of dependent and explanatory variables in productivity 
equation for Italy 
 PO (obs. 8332) PA (obs. 8089) RU (obs. 5106) 
   m
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n 
sd
 
m
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m
ax
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m
ax
 
 m
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n 
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m
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m
ax
 
Productivity(Quantity)   1.16 0.89 0 4.36  0.82 0.88 0 4.38  0.94 0.88 0 4.43 
Productivity(Quality)  1.55 0.95 0 3.76  1.16 1.02 0 3.17  1.34 1.02 0 3.57 
Productivity(effort)   0.15 0.15 0 0.69  0.13 0.16 0 0.69  0.13 0.15 0 0.69 
Quantity before 
promotion  1.00 0.59 0 3.24  0.86 0.53 0 3.32  0.82 0.63 0 3.31 
Quality before 
promotion  1.65 0.81 0 3.11  1.52 0.66 0 2.80  1.35 0.80 0 2.86 
Co-authors quantity  1.06 0.79 0 3.50  0.81 0.83 0 3.89  1.00 0.85 0 3.43 
Co-authors quality  1.47 0.96 0 3.62  1.09 1.03 0 3.12  1.32 1.01 0 3.11 
Co-authors zero 
Dummy  0.28 0.45 0 1  0.46 0.50 0 1  0.35 0.48 0 1 
Large Project Dummy  0.22 0.42 0 1  0.16 0.37 0 1  0.20 0.40 0 1 
Small Project with 
Foreign co-authors 
Dummy  0.48 0.50 0 1  0.33 0.47 0 1  0.39 0.49 0 1 
Small project with only 
National co-authors 
Dummy  0.19 0.39 0 1  0.26 0.44 0 1  0.24 0.42 0 1 
Small Project with co-
authors of unknown 
affiliations Dummy  0.01 0.11 0 1  0.02 0.15 0 1  0.02 0.14 0 1 
Wave 1980 (IT)  0.19 0.39 0 1  0.52 0.50 0 1  0.34 0.47 0 1 
Gender  0.05 0.21 0 1  0.13 0.34 0 1  0.28 0.45 0 1 
Age group 1  0.00 0.00 0 0  0.00 0.00 0 0  0.00 0.06 0 1 
Age group 3  0.25 0.44 0 1  0.44 0.50 0 1  0.38 0.49 0 1 
Age group 4  0.47 0.50 0 1  0.34 0.48 0 1  0.13 0.33 0 1 
Age group 5  0.27 0.44 0 1  0.12 0.33 0 1  0.01 0.09 0 1 
Fis01 (IT)  0.49 0.50 0 1  0.64 0.48 0 1  0.50 0.50 0 1 
Fis02 (IT)  0.27 0.44 0 1  0.20 0.40 0 1  0.24 0.43 0 1 
Zeros before promotion  0.15 0.36 0 1  0.08 0.27 0 1  0.17 0.37 0 1 
Promotion before 1975  0.08 0.28 0 1  0.00 0.00 0 0  0.00 0.00 0 0 
Zero after promotion  0.01 0.09 0 1  0.02 0.15 0 1  0.01 0.08 0 1 
 
 56 
 
Appendix Table 4: Two ways distribution of number of co-authors and of addresses explicitly 
listed in the articles. 
 France Addresses   Italy Addresses  
  0-5 
6-
10 
11-
20 >20    0-5 
6-
10 
11-
20 >20  
A
ut
ho
rs
 
1-5 65,66 0,16     65,82 
A
ut
ho
rs
 
1-5 65,61 1,27 0,01 0,00 66,89 
6-10 23,25 0,85 0,01  24,11 6-10 15,61 1,86 0,02  17,49 
11-20 2,63 0,77 0,05  3,46 11-20 3,21 1,82 0,15  5,18 
21-29 0,32 0,27 0,06 0,00 0,66 21-29 0,60 0,95 0,33 0,00 1,87 
Large 
projects 0,28 0,67 1,12 3,88 5,95 
Large 
projects 0,65 1,27 2,56 4,08 8,57 
  92,15 2,72 1,25 3,88 100,00   85,68 7,16 3,06 4,09 100,00 
 
Appendix Table 5: Average number of authors per nationality or affiliation to CERN, CNRS and 
CERN, for Large Project articles, based on the addresses explicitly listed. 
 France  Italy 
1 USA 4.39  USA 2.60 
2 GERMANY 1.70  INFN 2.30 
3 INFN 1.28  ITALY 2.00 
4 ENGLAND 1.28  GERMANY 1.25 
5 ITALY 1.06  ENGLAND 1.08 
6 CNRS 0.83  FRANCE 0.61 
7 FRANCE 0.72  CNRS 0.54 
8 RUSSIA 0.51  CERN 0.46 
9 CHINA 0.48  JAPAN 0.35 
10 BELGIUM 0.41  RUSSIA 0.34 
11 CERN 0.31  BELGIUM 0.25 
12 GREECE 0.29  SPAIN 0.24 
13 JAPAN 0.29  SWITZERLAND 0.24 
14 INDIA 0.23  CHINA 0.22 
15 NORWAY 0.19  GREECE 0.21 
16 SPAIN 0.19  NORWAY 0.16 
17 SWEDEN 0.11  INDIA 0.13 
18 SWITZERLAND 0.08  SWEDEN 0.09 
19 DENMARK 0.07  DENMARK 0.08 
20 CNR 0.02  CNR 0.04 
 * List limited to the 20 of most frequently cited countries or PROs. 
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Appendix Table 6: Total number of articles by the French and Italian physicists in the 20 first 
journals listed in terms of decreasing numbers of articles* 
    Publications 
N. Journal 
Entry 
date 
Exit 
date Italy France Total 
1 PHYSICAL REVIEW B 1975 2005 4225 3424 7649 
2 PHYSICAL REVIEW LETTERS 1975 2005 3000 2566 5566 
3 PHYSICS LETTERS B 1975 2005 4129 1045 5174 
4 
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS & METHODS IN 
PHYSICS RESEARCH SECTION A-
ACCELERATORS SPECTROMETERS DETECTORS 
AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT 1984 2005 2446 552 2998 
5 JOURNAL OF APPLIED PHYSICS 1975 2005 1245 1542 2787 
6 APPLIED PHYSICS LETTERS 1975 2005 1178 1347 2525 
7 NUCLEAR PHYSICS B 1975 2005 2039 308 2347 
8 PHYSICAL REVIEW A 1975 2005 1281 1036 2317 
9 JOURNAL OF CHEMICAL PHYSICS 1975 2005 875 1376 2251 
10 PHYSICAL REVIEW D 1975 2005 1586 499 2085 
11 PHYSICAL REVIEW E 1993 2005 1207 811 2018 
12 SOLID STATE COMMUNICATIONS 1975 2005 831 938 1769 
13 JOURNAL OF PHYSICS-CONDENSED MATTER 1989 2005 726 945 1671 
14 EUROPHYSICS LETTERS 1986 2005 778 858 1636 
15 
JOURNAL OF MAGNETISM AND MAGNETIC 
MATERIALS 1977 2005 535 1060 1595 
16 JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE 1975 1990 257 1193 1450 
17 OPTICS COMMUNICATIONS 1975 2005 625 810 1435 
18 JOURNAL DE PHYSIQUE IV 1991 2005 264 1140 1404 
19 
NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS & METHODS IN 
PHYSICS RESEARCH SECTION B-BEAM 
INTERACTIONS WITH MATERIALS AND ATOMS 1984 2005 731 652 1383 
20 PHYSICS LETTERS A 1975 2005 960 349 1309 
* The Table shows the first and last year in which we observe an article published on a journal (Entry date of 
the journal in the database and exit date of the journal from the database). It also gives the number of 
publications (Italian, French and the sum) available in the database for each journal. 
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Notes 
1 James Cattell published in 1903 the first systematic data collection on scientific papers per author 
and provided strong evidence of the existence of large differences across individuals, a result later 
systematized by Alfred Lotka’s well-known “power law”(Lotka, 1926). 
2 A third purpose served by these early enquiries was the study of disciplines, from their birth to 
consolidation. This is still a very much beaten path, although recent studies add to simple paper 
counts increasingly sophisticated applications of network analysis (Crane, 1972). 
3 Noteworthy exceptions are Turner and Mairesse (2002), Bonaccorsi and Daraio (2003), Hall et al. 
(2005), Mairesse and Turner (2006), and Breschi et al. (2007, 2008). 
4 Notice also that the US system is openly stratified according to the research vs. teaching intensity 
of institutions. On the contrary, both the Italian and French laws forbid universities to differentiate 
openly their mission, and to assign different research versus teaching loads to the faculty. 
5 See article 50 and 57  DPR 382/1980 for Italy and article 59 Décret n 84-431 du 6 juin 1984 for 
France. These laws can be found (in original language) on the following websites: 
http://www.pd.infn.it/infn_ric/GruppiLavoro/Stato_Giuridico/Stato%20Giuridico%20Universitari_
DPR382_1980.html  and http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/ 
6  While we revised the paper, the Ministry of Education announced a new change in the 
recruitment laws, which by June 2009, however, had not yet been entirely disclosed to the 
Parliament.  
7  This requires many behind-the–scene manoeuvres by the university, aimed at steering the 
election of the committee members in favour of friendly candidates. For a more in-depth 
discussion of this point, and of its consequences for academic careers in Italy, see Pezzoni et al. 
(2009) 
8 In August 2007, the Sarkozy presidency initiated a number of much debated and still on-going 
reforms which are  aimed  at giving autonomy to universities by shifting powers and 
administration of resources from the Ministry to them. 
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9  These disciplinary commissions are made up of 10 to 20 members, coming both from the 
discipline or possibly other disciplines in the university, and from the discipline in other 
universities. These commissions, in which PR and MCF sit in equal number, are elected for 4 years; 
they meet to deliberate on the recruitment of MCF in plenary formation, and on the promotion of 
PR in a formation restricted to PR. 
10 Note also in France the existence of institutions of higher education called “Grandes Ecoles”, 
such as “Ecole Normale Supérieure” and “Ecole Polytechnique” to cite two oldest and most 
prestigious ones. They are of very small size compared to universities, but they select excellent 
students, and have also developed good research activities in the last twenty years.  
11 : “..It is especially noteworthy that nobody who worked without collaborators or with only one 
co-author succeeded in producing more than four papers in the five-year period, whereas 
everybody with more than twelve collaborators produced fourteen or more papers in the same 
time..” (Price and Beaver, 1966, p. 1014) 
12 Not all the scientists classified in one discipline, in fact, have homogeneous research interests. In 
addition, it is often the case that some scientists are pushed to join (nominally) the discipline with 
the highest opportunities of promotion at a given point in time. Face-to-face interviews to Italian 
physicists show that some nuclear and particle physicists are classified as Fisica Sperimentale (Field 
FIS/01), which enters our study, instead of being classifies as Fisica Nucleare e Subnucleare (Field 
FIS/04), which we excluded from our study.  
13 This means in other words that we excluded the physics journals which have regularly received 
over a five year period less than 0.5 citations per article. It is also the case that ISI does not cover as 
well those low reputation journals. 
14 The list of the 20 journals with the larger number of publications in our database is reported in 
the Appendix Table 6. Interviews with a few physicists have confirmed that no top journals 
specialised in physics are missing. 
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15 Including generalist journals such as Science and Nature may create even more problems of 
homonymy than the ones we already have (if there are several “Smith J.” in physics, there must 
plenty when considering all disciplines!). Moreover, we believe there are strong correlations 
between publishing in specialized journals of good quality and generalist journals of outstanding 
reputation as Science and Nature. Such generalist journals are few and they are not alternative 
outlets to specialist physics journals. Top physicists who manage to publish the results of their 
research in Science and Nature also publish these results in specialized physics journals. In terms 
of descriptive statistics on “quantity” productivity, the errors we introduce should be more or less 
negligible. On “quality” productivity, the absence of a few very-high-impact-factor journals such 
as Science and Nature probably results in chopping up slightly the long tail of the productivity 
distribution of scientists. In terms of biases in our econometric analysis, one can expect that they 
will not be sizeable. At the same time, it is very unlikely that a physicist with a small publication 
record in specialized journals will publish many papers in Science or Nature. 
16 Most of the surnames of physicists we discarded are the homonyms in the ministerial lists. 
Otherwise we have had in fact to discard only 4 names of physicists for France and 2 for Italy 
because their computed productivity appeared much too large to be credible (with 30 papers or 
more for at least 10 years!) and they had also widespread surnames (e.g., CHEN or WANG). 
17 Following a referee’s request, we have also replicated our econometric analysis for the sample 
including the “zero-publications” physicists. Our main results do not change significantly, with the 
exception of the estimated effects of the 1980 and 1985 entry waves on productivity and promotion, 
which appear to be stronger. The tables showing these results are available on request. 
18  Of course the interest of this alternative is to be more parsimonious and provide direct estimates 
of unconditional impacts. We intend to explore it in future work. 
19 Note that while the productivity equations are estimated for the professor subsamples restricted 
to the observations after promotion, the promotion probit equations are estimated on all the 
observations, both before and after promotion, of these subsamples. We have preferred to use the 
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two-step Heckman method to the maximum likelihood, which encountered in some cases 
problems of convergence due apparently to our very large number of variables (including in 
particular in both the promotion and productivity regressions interactions of cohort of entry and 
year dummies, as explained in the next sub-section). 
20 Note that we might have also considered two probit equations accounting for the individual 
physicist probability of being recruited as respectively MCF and RU. That was not, however, really 
possible because of a much too short history of publications before recruitment (or even none) and 
for lack of other background information, such as on graduate studies. Moreover, that also seemed 
a priori less relevant than concerning promotion to professor. 
21 The standard approach in a panel data setting as ours is to control for permanent unobserved 
heterogeneity by including fixed individual effects in the equations. Although we may want to go 
back to this approach in future analysis, our first attempts were not promising. The advantage of 
our approach here is that past productivity variables largely correct for the likely heterogeneity 
biases by picking-up the correlated components of individual fixed effects, while being more 
informative than fixed effects per se and preserving, contrary to them, the relevant cross-sectional 
information in the data. 
22 We have also produced a series of ancillary regressions with author-weighted measures of 
quantity and quality, whose results do not differ substantially from those reported in this paper, 
and are available on request. 
23 It is common knowledge that bibliometric measures of productivity exhibit an increasing trend 
over time. Our data do not escape this regularity, both for quantity and quality. 
24 Publications in t-1 are excluded because the recruitment procedure (concorso in Italy or concours 
in France) can take many months, up to one year or so. Therefore, some publications appear after a 
candidate has filed for the job and are not considered by the commissions relevant for the 
appointment. 
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25 It’s worthwhile remarking that we do not have the full career profile of the scientists and 
therefore we do not know how many PR, PO and PA - that were promoted after 1980 in Italy and 
after 1984 in France – were previously recruited or promoted in the Wave 1980 and in the Wave 1985. 
26 We have also tried different specifications using directly the age variable and age squared and 
the results do not change substantially. 
27 In order to avoid endogeneity problems, we do not consider the co-authors’ publication to which 
the observed scientist also contributed. 
28 The information on affiliation and related addresses provided by ISI is not precise. For each 
publication, in fact, the authors’ names and affiliations are reported in separate fields, with no one-
to-one matching between the two. So there is no way to know how many authors of a publication 
come from a university or research institute among those listed; but only that at least one authors 
comes for sure from such university or institute. 
29 The share of articles with 30 or more co-authors is higher in Italy (8.57%) then in France (5.95%). 
Appendix Table 4 shows the percentage of large projects in the two countries and the information 
available about the affiliations (addresses) from the ISI database. Moreover, Appendix Table 5 
reports the average number of authors (per article) according to a list of 22 nationalities and PROs. 
US, German and English scientists are quite frequent co-authors in Large Projects publications, both 
in Italy and France. 
30 This dummy is an approximation since the addresses of the authors are not always reported in 
the articles.  
31 In the promotion equations we include a Zero lagged flow dummy indicating when past quantity 
and quality-productivity are zeros, while in the productivity equations we include a Zeros before 
promotion dummy. The reasons for including these two dummies is to allow for some functional 
form flexibility without imposing that a strict linearity through the value of zero for the effects of 
the corresponding variables which are measured in terms of log(1+x) (i.e., respectively the 
Quantity-productivity lagged flow and Quality-productivity lagged flow variables and the Quantity-
 67 
                                                                                                                                                    
productivity before promotion and Quality-productivity before promotion variables). The reason for the 
inclusion in the productivity equations of the Zeros after promotion dummy is different one. It is to 
fully abstract from the information that will be conveyed in the estimation of the productivity 
equations if we did not include it. It is thus simply equivalent to excluding the physicists with only 
zero publications after promotion from our study sample before estimating these equations. We 
could have also excluded these few physicists when estimating the promotion equations. Since 
these physicists have published one or more articles before promotion, we thought, however, 
better to keep them included (and at the same time to use a study sample based on the information 
concerning the exact same set of physicists in estimating both types of equations).  
32 In Italy, promotion to PO appears to be easier in Fisica teorica (Field FIS/02) rather than Fisica della 
materia (Field FIS/03, the reference dummy). On the other hand the chances of being promoted to a 
PA position are higher in Fisica sperimentale (Field Fis/01). In France, promotion to PR are more 
likely in Milieux dilués et optique (Field 30), compared to Milieux denses et matériaux (Field 28). 
33 Variables quality and quantity flow are highly correlated 
34 Notice that the variable Zero flow is positive and statistically significant in all the selection 
equations. At first sight this result looks puzzling, but in fact it depends on the design of the 
pooled-probit exercise. In such exercise the dependent variable is a binary one, which takes value 
one from time t onward, for all scientists who are promoted at time t. After t many scientists may 
stop publishing altogether, so the value one of the dummy Zero flow is often coupled with unitary 
model outcome. This variable should be considered as a control for the zeros and its omission does 
not affect the estimates of other regressors. 
35 In a separate regression exercise we have tested the effect of age on productivity of Italian PO, in 
the absence of controls for participation to large and/or international projects. In this case, the 
impact of age on productivity (quantity) appears to be negligible. One interpretation is that PO 
suffer of a productivity loss at the individual level, which they compensate by participating to 
large international projects. 
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36 Throughout Section 5 we express the impact of the covariates on quantity (the number of articles) 
or quality, (average impact factor) by means of marginal effects, which we compute on the basis of 
the estimated coefficients in Tables 6 and 7. The marginal effect of any dummy covariates is given 
by: )1( −⋅=∆ − βeey DR  where DRe −  is the average predicted value of the model minus the 
dummy D effect and β  is the coefficient of D. As for the marginal effects of a continuous or 
discrete covariate, this is given by: 
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the coefficient (elasticity) estimated in the regressions. 
37 More precisely, among the Italians hired during the 1980 wave the unproductive PO, PA and RU 
are respectively 1.6%, 6.7% and 7.6%. In France 21.9% are MCF and 9.8% are PR. Notice that, 
following referee request we rerun all the regression including all scientists with zero publications. 
The effect of the waves is confirmed and become even stronger. 
38 Another peculiarity of the waves is that in Italy were hired considerably younger academics if 
compared to the average age of hiring in other years; this is true also for PR in France but not for 
MCF with an average age of 41 instead of the usual age of 32 in other years. In general there are no 
big differences for the gender composition of the academics promoted during the waves except for 
the rank of RU where, during the wave were promoted 14% more women (36% instead of 22%). 
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